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This articlefinds that even in the 1980s, when barriers to
international capital mobility had been largely elimi-
nated, there was no measurable tendencyfor real interest
rates between the U.S. and the major industrial countries
to converge. Moreover, the estimated short-run responses
ofboth short-term andlong-term real interest rates to one
another have been exceedingly weak. Asa consequence, it
appears that U.S. and foreign central banks have been
able to influence their domestic interest rates quite inde-
pendently from the influence of interest rates abroad,
despite a high degree of international capital mobility.
The international integration of financial markets has in-
creased dramatically in the last two decades. In the 1970s
government-imposed barriers to the international flow of
capitalinthemajorindustrializedcountries weregradually
relaxed, and by the 1980s they had been substantially
eliminated.! Moreover, the development and growth of
new financial instruments, such as currency and interest
rate swaps, have further stimulated international financial
integration by giving investors a wider range of choices
than traditionally available in purely domestic financial
markets.
It might be presumed that the international integration
of financial markets would reduce divergences between
interestrates athome andabroadandincreasethe degreeto
which yields in different national markets move together
over time. If so, the ability of central banks to influence
national interestrates mightbe importantly constrainedby
international flows of capital. This presumption would
appear to be supported historically by the domestic inte-
gration oflocal financial markets. Forexample, the devel-
opment of national money and capital markets in the
United States during the latter part of the 19th century
reducedregional disparities among interestrates andmade
these rates increasingly responsive to national as opposed
to local conditions. Moreover, after the establishment of
the Federal Reserve System in 1914, it became apparent
that, because ofthe ease ofcapital flows between different
regions, monetary policyneededto bemadeon a national,
rather than a regional, basis.
International financial integrationneed not always work
to equalize interestrates betweendifferent countries, how-
ever. Ifexchange rates between currencies are fixed, then
international financial integration has much the same ef-
fect on interest rates as regional financial integration. But
if exchange rates are flexible, exchange rate expectations
and exchange rate risk may prevent a convergence ofreal
interestrates. As barriers to financial flows across national
borders were reduced in the 1970s, the systemofexchange
rates applying to the majorcurrencies changedfrom one of
fixed to flexible rates. In fact, the flexibility of rates
probably contributed to reductions in barriers to financial
flows by reducing the need for capital controls to manage
payments imbalances. As aresult, atthe sametimethatone
1. See, for example, Akhtar and WeiHer (1987).4 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 3
source of interest rate divergence was reduced, another
one increased. Earlier empirical studies have provided
mixed evidence on whether real interest rates have tended
to converge in recent years. 2
This article uses cointegration tests and error-correction
modeling to examine the issue. It first reviews the theo-
retical literature on the short- and long-run connections
between the international mobility of capital and the
equalization ofnational interest rates. Itthen explains how
exchange rate expectations and exchange rate risk in a
system of flexible exchange rates can create divergences
between real interest rates even in the absence of institu-
tional or governmental barriers to capital flows across
national borders. Finally, it examines empirically the link-
ages between U.S. and foreign real interest rates.
Itfinds that even in the 1980s, when barriers to interna-
tional capital mobility had been largely eliminated, there
was no measurable tendency for real interestrates between
the U.S. and the major industrial countries to converge.
Moreover, the estimated short-run responses ofboth short-
term and long-term real interest rates to one another have
been exceedingly \Xleak. A.s aconsequence, it appears that
U.S. and foreign central banks have been able to influence
their domestic interest rates quite independently from the
influence ofinterest rates abroad, despite a high degree of
international capital mobility.
I. INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIALS
IN THE SHORT AND LoNG RUN
This section reviews the analytics ofinternational interest
rate linkages in the short and the long run under flexible
exchange rates. The sources ofdifferences between nomi-
nalinterestrates athomeand abroadcanbe summarizedby
the following identity:
(1) i - i* = lin %se + CRISK + DOM + BAR
i and i* are, respectively, nominal interest rates in home
and foreign currency denominated assets ofagiven matur-
ity (n); The variable % se is the expected percentage
depreciation in the value of the home currency over the
maturity ofthe investment; CRISK constitutes the part of
the differential due to the uncertainty in returns from
2. Pigott (1993-1994) presents evidence to show that the dispersion in
national real interest rates has fluctuated considerably over time but
without any systematic tendency to decline. Despitethis evidence, some
observers have argued thatintegrationhas increasedthe synchronization
of interest rate movements over the last decade; see, for example,
Frankel (1989) and Bank. for International Settlements (1988). However,
Kasman and Pigott (1988) find no consistent increase in this tendency
using different but equally plausible measures ofsynchronization.
investing in a foreign asset due to the risk ofchanges in the
exchange rate over the period of the investment; DOM is
the portion of the differential that is due to differences
in the characteristics ofthe assets besides maturity, such as
liquidity, credit risk, or tax treatment, which ca.'1 occur in
purely domestic markets; finally, BAR represents the part
of the differential that is due to government policies and
institutional imperfections that effectively impede finan-
cial flows across national jurisdictions.3
Nominal interestrates are equalizedifall theright-hand-
side terms of the identity are equal to zero. If CRISK,
DOM, andBAR are allequal to zero, thenU.S. and foreign
assets can be said to be perfect substitutes. In this case,
investors are indifferent between domestic and foreign
assets, andtheirexpected yields in a commoncurrency are
equalized. In addition,· if portfolio adjustments are in-
stantaneous, so that the yields in a common currency are
equalized continuously, then there is said to be perfect
capital mobility. Finally, if %se is zero, then expectations
are static inthe sense that the exchangerateexpectedin the
future is the same as the current exchange rate. Only ifall
these conditions are met, giving perfect capital mobility
andstaticexchangerateexpectations, willnominalinterest
rates be equalized continuously at home and abroad under
flexible exchange rates.
The well-known Mundell-Fleming model of an open
economy assumes that the conditions of perfect capital
mobility and static exchange rate expectations hold in the
shortrun under flexible exchange rates.4 The implications
of these conditions would be that monetary policy influ-
ences aggregate demand entirely through its effect on the
exchange rate, rather than interest rates, and that fiscal
policy "crowds out" other expenditures entirely through
the exchange rate instead ofinterest rates. These implica-
tions are clearly at variance with even the most casual
observation. IntheU.S. andotherindustrializedcountries,
actions by monetary authorities clearly can alter interest
rates in the short run, ahd fiscal policy appears to have
influencedinterestrates as well. Therefore, to betterunder-
stand the behavior of interest rates in the short run, the
Mundell-Fleming framework needs to be amended.
The Mundell-Fleming model essentially extends the
widely used IS-LM model ofincome determination to an
open economy. Both models assume the price level is fixed
in the short run. The Mundell-Fleming model is described
by the following set ofequations:
3. For further discussion ofthe various factors underlying this identity,
see Kasman and Pigott (1988).
4. The Mundell-Fleming model was developed in the early 1960s.
Mundell's contributions are collected in Mundell (1968). For Fleming's
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The first equation describes equilibrium in the goods
market. It states that real aggregate output (Y) is equal to
real domestic expenditures (A), which vary inversely with
the nominal interest rate i, plus net exports, which vary
inversely with the value ofthe home currency. The second
equation gives equilibrium in the money market. The
supply ofreal moneybalances,MIP, equals the demandfor
them, L (i,Y). The lastequation describes the conditions of
perfect capital mobility and static expectations for a small
country, which produce an equality between the home (i)
and an exogenously determined foreign (i*)interest rate.
Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of interest rates in the
shortrun in theMundell-Fleming model with static expec-
tations and perfect capital mobility, In Figure la, a shift to
the right in the LM schedule because of, say, an action
by the .. monetary authority to expand the money supply




Y = A(i) + NX(s)
MIP = L(i,Y)
i = i*
because the expected return on investing at home then
would be less than that from investing abroad, the value of
the home currency is depressed by capital outflows. Then
as soon as the trade balance adjusts to the lower value of
the home currency, the IS schedule shifts to the right un-
til the home interest rate is pulled back up to the level of
the foreign rate. In this process, there is no net change
in the home interest rate. As a result, monetary policy
influences aggregate demand entirely through its effect on
the exchange rate.
Alternatively, a shift in the IS schedule to the right as in
Figure lb because of, say, an expansionary fiscal policy
initially pushes the home interest rate above the foreign
interestrate. Butthe resulting capitalinflow then moves up
the value ofthe home currency andreduces net exports un-
til the home interest rate falls back down to the level ofthe
foreign rate. In the process, the fiscal expansion "crowds
out" other expenditures entirely through its effect on the
exchange rate.
The Mundell-Fleming model assumes a small country.
But relaxing this assumption does not change its conclu-
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5. For evidence on the speed ofadjustment ofthe trade balance, see, for
example, Throop (1989).
6. See Dornbusch (1976).
This would still tend to zero except for the period during
which the trade balance adjusts. However, in practice, the
periodrequired for thetradebalanceto adjustlastsfor up to
around two years, so that in calendartime the period over
which one cansay lhatperfectcapitalmobilitymay exist is
not trivial.5 Because of this, the Mundell-Fleming model
has limitedapplicabilityfor periods shorterthantwoyears.
A further important limitation ofthe Mundell-Fleming
model for the short run is its assumption ofstatic expecta-
tions. Still retaining the assumption of perfect capital
mobilityfor the relevant timeframe, whenexpectations are
not static the identity ofequation (1) becomes:
where E(ln s) is the expected value ofthe natural log ofthe
exchangerate. Furthermore, ifE(lns)and i* are fixed, then
the value of the home currency, s, becomes simply a
function ofthe home interest rate. This situation is shown
in Figure 2, where both i and s are now plotted on the
verticalaxes. The IS schedule is flatter than beforebecause
movement along it now includes the effects on aggregate
demand of movements in both the exchange rate and the
interest rate, rather than just the interest rate alone.
Consider now the effects ofmonetary and fiscal policy
manifested in shifts in the LM and IS schedules. An
expansionary monetary policy that shifts the LM schedule
to the right (as in Figure 2a) now drives down the home
interest rate even after there has been time enough for the
trade balance to adjust to the lower value of the home
currency. The differential that is opened up between the
home and foreign interest rate is proportional to the ex-
pected appreciation of the home currency and would not
change as long as the current price level, the expected
exchange rate, and the expanded money supply persist. If
the economy initially had been at full employment, in the
long run the adjustment ofthe price level and expectations
would eventually drive the system back to its original
equilibrium with the same IS and LM schedules as before.
Even with forward looking rational expectations, however,
a differential between real interest rates would persist
during the gradual adjustment of the price level until the
full employment equilibrium is restored.6 As a result,
monetary disturbances can create persistent and time-
varying differentials inreal interestrates even with perfect





i - i* = 11n %se
In s = E(ln s) + n(i - i*)
A fiscal expansion similarly causes persistent effects on
interestrate differentials when expectations are not static.
Lower taxes and/or higher government expenditures shift
the IS schedule to the right (asin Figure 2b). Now, rather
than just the exchange rate changing, as in the pure
Mundell-Fleming model, both the interestrate and the ex-
change rate are driven up. With the expected value ofthe
exchange rate fixed, a gap is openedup between the home
andforeign interestrate thatis proportionalto the expected
depreciation in the value of the home currency. This gap
and boththe higherinterestrate and increasein real output
will last as long as fiscal policy remains expansive and the
expected exchange rate is unchanged.
As long as the fiscal policy remains expansive, however,
the actual exchange rate will be above that which was
expected. Then, expectations ofthe exchange rate may be
revised up. Ifso, the currentexchange rate wouldrise with
any given interest rate differential, breaking the original
linkage between the interest rate and the exchange rate.
The rise in the expected value ofthe home currency would
then shift the IS scheduleback toward its original position.
It is only at this point that the differential between home
and foreign interestrates would beeliminated. This analy-
sis generalizes to any shiftinthe IS schedule, notjustthose
caused by fiscal policy. Thus, interest differentials could
exist more or less continuously and vary considerably
underflexible exchange rates due to a variable IS function,
as well as a variable LM function, even with relatively
perfect capital mobility.
Further relaxing the assumptions ofthe Mundell-Flem-
ing model, consider now the case ofimperfect substituta-
bilitybetweenhomeandforeign assets duetocurrencyrisk
(CRISK), differences in the characteristics of home and
foreign assets (DOM), or governmental and institutional
barriers to international capital flows (BAR). These put
interestrates in the home country ata premiumordiscount
compared with foreign rates. For simplicity, suppose ini-
tially there is no differential betweeninterestrates at home
and abroad. A rightward shift in the IS schedule to IS'(s),
causedby afiscal deficitoran investmentboom, wouldput
upward pressure on the home interest rate relative to that
abroad (Figure 3). With imperfect substitutability of as-
sets, however, the resulting inflow of capital from abroad
would tend to raise the required return on U.S. assets
relative to foreign assets. The premium would berequired
inorderfor investors to absorb alargerproportionofhome
assets into theirportfolios, since the stockofhome relative
to foreign assets is increased by both the larger capital
inflow and the appreciation ofthe home currency. Instead
ofbeing shifted backto IS'(s), the IS schedule would shift
back only to IS'(s') due to the appreciation of the home
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brought down to the level ofthe foreign interest rate plus a
premium. Here again, the differential between interest
rates would vary over time.
Even with a high degree ofinternational financial mar-
ket integration so that DOM and BAR are close to zero,
imperfect substitutability can still be created by currency
risk (CRISK). As a result, even with highly integrated
markets under flexible exchange rates, home and foreign
interest rates may be kept apart not only by expected
changes in currency values but also by currency risk.
Finally, and particularly for purposes of empirical im-
plementation, it is necessary to relax the assumption of
constant prices in the Mundell-Fleming model. The iden-
tity of equation (1) still holds. But it is convenient to
rewrite it in real terms as7
(7) r - r* = lin %qe + CRISK + DOM + BAR,
7. The identity of equation (1) can be written as:
i, - i; = lin [In s, - E,(ln s,+n)] + CRISK, + DOM, + BAR,.
By definition In s, = inq, + Inp; - In p" where qis the real exchange
rate and p*andp are foreign and domestic price levels, respectively.
Also by definition,
E, (In s'+n) = E, (In q,+n) + Inp; + n7r; - p, - n7r"8 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 3
whererandr* are real interestrates (nominalinterestrates
less expectedinflation) athome and abroad, %qe is the ex-
pectedpercentchangeintherealexchangerateoverthema-
turityoftheinvestment, andthe otherterms are the same as
before.8 In the case of perfect substitutability and static
expectations (with respect to the real exchange rate),
capital would flow from one country to another until real
interest rates at home and abroad were equalized. In the
case orimperfect substitutability, the real interest at home
would tend to be equated with the foreign one plus a
premiumorminus a discount, which itselfcould vary over
time. But with nonstatic expectations, the real exchange
rate becomes a function of the real interest rate at home
relativetothatabroad. Movementsofthe IS andLMsched-
ules create a variable differential inreal interestrates (plus
a premium or minus a discount) that is proportional to the
expected change in the real value ofthe exchange rate as it
moves towards its equilibrium in the long run.
n. REAL INTEREST RATE RELATIONSHIPS
A trend toward the liberalization of capital controls has
been clearly evident since the early 1970s, and in recent
years ithas becomeeven morepronounced.9 Infact, by the
1980s both official and institutional barriers to interna-
tional capital flows had been largely eliminated in the
major industrialized countries, at leastfor large borrowers
and lenders. At the short end of the market, this is indi-
cated by a close equality between U.S. and major foreign
interestrates when the latter are covered against exchange
rate risk in the forward market.10
Forward markets are most developed at the 3-month
maturity and do not exist at maturities greater than two
years, even among well-tradedcurrencies. Butinthe 1980s
the currency swapmarketbecamesufficientlydeveloped to
hedgeexchangerateriskfor long-terminvestments as well.
A currency swap is an agreement to exchange a stream of
payments in one currency for a stream of payments in
where 'IT,* and 'lTt are the market's expectations at time tofthe inflation
rate over nperiods at home and abroad, respectively. Substituting these
two relationships into the identity gives:
(it - 'lTt) - (i,* - 'IT,*) = lin [In qt - E (In qt+n)]
+ CRISK + DOM + BAR.
8. The real value of the home currency, s, is defined as: q=s(plp*),
where p and p* are the home and foreign price levels, respectively.
9. This trend is documented in International Monetary Fund's annual
report on Exchange Arrangements andExchange Restrictions.
10. For the evidence on covered returns on short-term assets, see Pigott
(1993-1994), Caramazza et al. (1986), and Frankel (1988).
another. Like a forward contract, a currency swap allows a
domestic investor to hold a foreign currency denominated
asset without currency risk. Deviations from a covered
parityininterestrates appearto be somewhatlargeramong
long-term assets than among short-term assets, butfor the
major currencies the differences are small. Moreover,
current deviations from covered parity ofboth short- and
long-term interest rates are small compared with periods
when capital controls have been considered important.
Thus, the increase in international financial capital mobil-
ity ofthe lastdecadehas notbeenlimitedtothe markets for
short-term assets.ll
With official and insitutional barriers to international
capital flows largely eliminated, this leaves only currency
risk and expected changes in currency values as sources of
differences between real interest rates on similar assets.
Figure 4 shows ex ante real U.S. and trade-weighted
foreign 3-month money market rates and the differential
between them, as well as the corresponding rates and
differentials with Canada, Japan, Germany, and the U.K.
for the period 1981 to the present. Figure 5 plots the real
rates and differentials for the same countries with respect
to long-term government bonds. Expected inflation is
measured by the percent change in the CPI over the
previous year for short rates and by a centered 3-year
moving average of CPI inflation for long rates. As other
researchers have shown, a contemporaneous equality ofex
ante real interestrates, whethershort-termorlong-term, is
easily rejected.12 Even during the period ofrelatively high
capital mobility in the 1980s, substantial differentials in
both shortandlong realrates existedfor significantperiods
oftime. This result is consistent with a Mundell-Fleming
model in which exchange rate expectations are not static,
so that movements in the IS and LM schedules create
variable real interestrate differentials that are proportional
to the expected change in the currency towards its equi-
librium real value in the long run. Variable premia for
currency risk also could produce this result.
The more interesting and also more difficult question
to answer is whether shocks to the IS and LM schedules
are infrequent and transitory enough, and variations in
currency risk premiums small enough, that a tendency
towards a convergence of real interest rates can be ob-
served over the longer run. Evidence suggesting that this
may not be the case is that real interest rate differentials
have been shown to be an important force moving real
11. Evidence on the covered returns on long-term assets is provided by
Popper (1990).
12. See, for example, Cumby and Obstfe1d (1984), Mishkin (1984),
Merrick and Saunders (1986), and Gaab, Granzio1, and Homer (1986).THROOP/ INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION 9
FIGURE 4
u.s. AND FOREIGN SHORT-TERM REAL INTEREST RATES AND THEIR DIFFERENTIALS
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FIGURE 5
u.s. AND FOREIGN loNG-TERM REAL INTEREST RATES AND THEIR DIFFERENTIALS
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exchange rates over extended periods in·the 1970s and
1980s, consistent withan assumptionofnonstatic expecta-
tions in the Mundell-Fleming model.13 This has been
especially true for the U.S. dollar in the first half of the
1980s, when a combination ofeasy fiscal policy and tight
monetary policy in the U.S. pushed up U.S. real interest
rates relative to those abroad. As a result, it may be that
tendencies for the equalization of national real interest
rates are not easily discernible in this period.
This analysis looks at tendencies toward the conver-
gence ofreal interest rates for both the period ofrelatively
high capital mobility since the early 1980s as well as the
whole period of floating exchange rates since 1973 since
the former periodmay betoo shortto uncover suchtenden-
cies. Ifthere were a significant tendency for real interest
rates to converge over the longer period butnot the shorter
one, one could say that capital controls in the 1970s were
not sufficient to offset the tendency towards convergence,
but that convergence can take quite a long time under flex-
ible exchange rates. On the other hand, if there were no
significant tendency observable in either period, all that
could be said would be that although a tendency towards
convergence could not be found for the period of high
capital mobility since the early 1980s, such a tendency
might be uncovered if a longer period of high capital
mobility with flexible exchange rates could be observed.
The strongest hypothesis with respect to long-run con-
vergence ofnational real interestrates would be that there
is a tendency towards equality. Statistically, this would
imply that real interest differentials are stationary, i.e.,
they do not have a tendency to trend either up or down
throughtime. Stationarityofbothshort- andlong-termreal
interest rate differentials for both the short period of full
financial market integration since the early 1980s and the
longer period of floating rates since 1973 was examined
using the augmentedDickey-Fullertest.14Thenull hypoth-
esis ofnonstationaritywas acceptedatthe 1percentlevel of
significance in all cases.
Thus, only a weaker form ofconvergence may exist. A
weakerhypothesis wouldbethatreal interestrates at home
and abroad are cointegrated in the sense that they do not
tend to drift apart overtime. Statistically, this means that a
linear combination of the two interest rates would be
13. See Throop (1993) and references therein to the extensive literature
on the subject. Besides confirming the importance ofreal interest rate
differentials in explaining the behavior of real exchange rates since
1973, Throop (1993) also shows that the market's expectation of the
long-run equilibrium of the real value of the dollar tends to be impor-
tantly affected by the real price ofoil, budget deficits, and the relative
price of traded versus nontraded goods.
14. For adiscussion ofthe augmented Dickey-Fullertest, see Charemza
and Deadman (1992), chapter 5.
stationary. Thus, if rand r* are cointegrated, then the
cointegrating vector, r- ao- a1r*, would be stationary.
For long-run equality, ao= 0 and a 1= 1.0. But different
national tax rates couldcause a 1 to be different from 1.0,
andcurrencyriskpremiumsorotherfactors mightcauseao
to differ from zero. So cointegration would appear to be a
better criterion for convergence than equality.
TheEngle-Grangertwo-stepprocedurecouldbeusedto
test fOithe cointegiation ofpaiis ofrealintciest iates. This
procedure would estimate r=ao+a1r* by ordinary least
squares and test for the stationarity of the residuals by
means ofthe Dickey-Fullertest.15 Buta more powerful test
is the Johansen procedure, which estimates the cointegrat-
ing vectorwithinthe contextofacomplete error-correction
model.16 Estimation ofthis type ofmodel also has the ad-
vantage ofproviding estimates ofthe dynamics ofthe re-
sponse of one interest rate to another, and therefore the
timeittakes for the systemto reach along-runequilibrium.
This vector error-correction model consists of regres-
sions of changes in each of the two real interest rates on
pastchanges in its own rate, past changes in the other rate,
and a lagged error-correction term equal to the cointegrat-
ing vector. Assuming that the real interestrates are nonsta-
tionary, the regressions are in change form (except for the
error-correction term) in order to avoid spurious correla-
tionsthatotherwise mightresultfrom unitroots inthe data.
The error-correction termis includedin the regressions ifit
canbeshownthatthe real interestrates arecointegrated, in
the sense that they tend toward a stable long-run equilib-
riumrelationship. The error-correction term is equal to the
difference between the actual and long-run predicted val-
ues of each interest rate. This ensures that the system
moves toward a long-run equilibrium ifone exists. Using
this two equation system, impulse-response functions are
derived to examine the estimated short- and long-run
responses ofeach real interest rate to shocks to eitherrate.
Formally, this two-equation system is written asP
4 4
(8) D.r = i~l BlliD.r:i + i~l B12Ar_i
4 4
(9) D.r* = i~l B2liD.r:i + i~l B22iD.r_i
15. SeeEngle andGranger(1987), Engle and Yoo (1987), andCharemza
and Deadman (1992), chapter 5.
16. See Johansen and Juselius (1990).
17. Four lags on past changes in rates were used in estimating the
cointegrating vector. Also, constant terms in the vector autoregressions
were restrictedto zero, maximizingthechance offinding cointegration.12 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 3
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that all short-
term and long-term real interest rates are nonstationary in
levels, but stationary in first differences for the period1981
to the present, as well as for the full period of the float,
consistent with regressions in first difference form. To
determine whether error-correction terms should be in-
cluded in each of the regression equations, we test for
cointegrationbetweenpairs ofrealinterestrates.Ifalinear
combination of the two (nonstationary) interest rates is
stationary, then they are cointegrated. Tables 1and 2 com-
pare the maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics of the
Johansen test for cointegration with their critical values.
Thesestatistics showthattheforeign trade-weightedshort-
term real interest rate is the only foreign rate that is
cointegrated with the U.S. real short-term rate for the pe-
riod of high capital mobility in the 1980s. If the sample
periodis extendedto the periodofthe full float, the foreign
trade-weighted short-term real rate ceases to be cointe-
grated with the U.S. rate, presumably becauseofincreased
barriers to capital mobility, but the Japanese real rate now
becomes cointegrated with the U.S. real rate, despite such
barriers.
These results suggest that on average there was a statis-
tically significant long-run linkage between u.s. and for-
TABLE 1
JOHANSEN TEST FOR COINTEGRATION: SHORT REAL RATES
MAXIUMUM EIGENVALUE TEST
Statistic Critical Values
US. and: Null Alternative 1981.Ql-l993.Q3 1974.QI-1993.Q3 5% 10%
Canada r = 0 r = 1 11.3 7.8 15.8 13.8
r ~ 1 r = 2 2.5 4.8 9.1 7.6
Germany r = 0 r = 1 8.2 8.7 15.8 13.8
r ~ 1 r = 2 3.6 6.8 9.1 7.6
Japan r = 0 r = 1 11.2 17.5** 15.8 13.8
r ~ 1 r = 2 1.2 4.9 9.1 7.6
UK. r = 0 r = 1 10.8 7.2 15.8 13.8
r ~ 1 r = 2 2.5 6.3 9.1 7.6
Trade-weighted r = 0 r = 1 26.3** 7.1 15.8 13.8
r ~ 1 r = 2 3.4 3.7 9.1 7.6
TRACE TEST
US. and:
Canada r = 0 r> 1 13.7 12.6 20.2 18.0
r ~ 1 r = 2 2.5 4.8 9.1 7.6
Germany r = 0 r> 1 11.8 15.5 20.2 18.0
r ~ 1 r = 2 3.6 6.8 9.1 7.6
Japan r = 0 r> 1 12.4 22.5** 20.2 18.0
r ~ 1 r = 2 1.2 4.9 9.1 7.6
UK. r = 0 r> 1 13.3 13.5 20.2 18.0
r ~ 1 r = 2 2.5 6.3 9.1 7.6
Trade-weighted r = 0 r ;;. 1 29.7** 10.9 20.2 18.0
r ~ 1 r = 2 3.4 3.7 9.1 7.6
NOTE: ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.THROOP/ INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION 13
eign trade-weighted real short-term interest rates in the
period of high capital mobility. However, examination of
the estimated cointegrating vector, shown in Table 3,
revealsthattheUS. andforeign trade-weightedshort-term
rates are estimated to have moved inversely with one an-
otherin the longrun. This is notconsistentwith atendency
toward convergence of real interest rates. On the other
hand, in the case ofthe Japanese shortrate over the longer
period, the U.S. and Japanese rate are estimated to move
positively with one another in the long run, consistentwith
convergence. However, aChiSquaretestrejects therestric-
tion that the foreign real interest rate is equal to the home
real interest rate in the long run in both cases, and italso
rejects the restriction that the foreign interest rate differs
from the home interest rate by at most a constant. So even
where a tendency towards the long-run convergence of
interestrates isfound, asinthecaseofJapan, itis relatively
weak.
Turning to long rates, there is no evidence ofany signif-
icant cointegration between US. and foreign real rates
in the period ofhigh capital mobility since the beginning
of the 1980s (see Table 2). But significant cointegration
betweenthe reallong-termUS. rateandthe corresponding
rates abroadis indicatedfor GermanyandJapan for thefull
TABLE 2
JOHANSEN TEST FOR COINTEGRATION: LoNG REAL RATES
MAXIUMUM EIGENVALUE TEST
Statistic Critical Values
US. and: Null Alternative 1981.QI-1992.Q2 1974.QI-1992.Q2 5% 10%
Canada r = 0 r = 1 8.6 6.5 15.8 13.8
r ~ 1 r = 2 5.4 4.0 9.1 7.6
Germany r = 0 r = 1 10.1 14.1 * 15.8 13.8
r ~ 1 r = 2 6.3 4.3 9.1 7.6
Japan r = 0 r = 1 9.9 17.1 ** 15.8 13.8
r ~ 1 r = 2 1.8 7.2 9.1 7.6
UK. r = 0 r = 1 5.4 11.5 15.8 13.8
r ~ 1 r = 2 4.8 4.0 9.1 7.6
Trade-weighted r=O r = 1 7.6 8.1 15.8 13.8
r ~ 1 r = 2 5.4 4.2 9.1 7.6
TRACE TEST
US. and:
Canada r = 0 r> 1 14.1 10.8 20.2 18.0
r ~ 1 r = 2 5.4 4.0 9.1 7.6
Germany r = 0 r ~ I 16.4 18.4* 20.2 18.0
r ~ 1 r = 2 6.3 4.3 9.1 7.6
Japan r = 0 r ~ 1 11.7 24.3** 20.2 18.0
r ~ 1 r~2 1.8 7.2 9.1 7.6
UK. r = 0 r ~ 1 10.3 15.5 20.2 18.0
r ~ 1 r = 2 4.9 4.0 9.1 7.6
Trade-weighted r=O r ~ 1 13.0 12.3 20.2 18.0
r ~ 1 r = 2 5.4 4.2 9.1 7.6
NOTE: ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.14 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 3
TABLE 3
JOHANSEN TEST FOR RESTRICTION ON COINTEGRATING VECTOR
ESTIMATED CHI-SQUARE TEST ON CHI-SQUARE TEST ON
COINTEGRATING (l.0, 0.0, - 1.0) (1.0, (lQ, -1.0)
COUNTRY PERIOD RATES VECTOR RESTRICTION RESTRICTION
Trade-weighted 1981.Ql-1993.Q3 Short (1.0, -11.3, 2.1) 23.5 (.005) 22.6 (.005)
Japan 1974.Ql-1993.Q3 Short (1.0,5.6, - 2.4) 10.8 (.005) 8.5 (.005)
Japan 1974.Ql-1992.Q2 Long (l.0, -76.1, 16.0) 10.8 (.005) 8.5 (.005)
Germany 1974.Ql-1992.Q2 Long (1.0, 7.8, - 2.6) 5.5 (.050) 9.9 (.005)
NOTE: Significance levels are in parentheses.
periodofthe float. The Germanand the U.S. long rates are
estimatedto bepositivelyrelatedinthe long run, consistent
withconvergence. Butanegative long-runrelationis found
between U.S. and Japanese real long-term interest rates.
Moreover, the restriction of either a one-to-one long-run
relationship betweenu.s. and foreign real long-term rates
or a constant difference between them is rejected by a Chi
Square test in both cases (Table 3).
Impulse-response functions from the estimated vector
error-correction systems are examined next. The response
ofthe foreign rate to a shock to the U.S. rate is determined
by shocking the error term, el' in equation (8) by one per-
centagepoint. Itis assumedthatany correlationbetweenel
and e2 in equations (8) and (9) is attributable to an effect
ofe2 on el' rather than the other way around. This implies
thate2 is not affectedby this shockandthatthe foreign rate
is influenced onlythrough the remaining terms in equation
(9). This procedure avoids a possibly spurious element of
contemporaneous causation in the simulated response, but
it also may underestimate the effect ofthe U.S. rate on the
foreign rate ifthere is infact somecontemporaneouscausa-
tion ofe2 by el . Similarly, in the caseofthe response ofthe
U.S. rate to theforeign rate, itis assumed that any correla-
tion between el and e2 is attributable to the effect ofel on
e2' However, ifitis assumedthatthe causationbetween the
correlated elements of the error terms runs in opposite
directions, the simulated impulse-response functions are
not changed to any significant extent.
For short rates, estimates are for the period of high
capitalmobility since the early 19808, exceptin the caseof
Japan where there was a stronger linkage of interest rates
for the full period of the float. Error-correction terms are
included in the systems for the U.S. and foreign trade-
weighted rates and for the U.S. and Japanese rates, al-
thoughintheformercasethe signs ofthecoefficientsinthe
error-correction term are not consistent with a positive
association between interest rates in the long run. The
impulse-responsefunctions for long-runrates also are from
the period since the beginning of the 1980s, except for
Germany and Japan, which are for the full period of the
float. Error-correction terms are included in the case
of those two countries as well. But only in the case of
Germanydo the signs ofthe coefficients indicateapositive
association between interest rates on U.S. and foreign
assets in the long run.
Figure 6A shows the simulated impact on the foreign
rate over 16 quarters of a permanent 1 percentage point
shockto the U.S. real short-terminterestrate, whileFigure
6B plots the simulated response ofthe U.S. real short rate
to a permanent 1 percentage point shock to the foreign
rate. The dotted line indicates a 95 percent confidence in-
terval around the estimated impulse-response functions. 18
The response offoreign short rates to a shock to the U.S.
short rate is not significantly different from zero for either
the trade-weighted rate or the four national interest rates.
The response ofthe U.S. short rate to a shock to the U.K.
short rate is significantly positive but small, after 16 quar-
ters. But the response ofthe U.S. short rate to the foreign
trade-weighted short rate is significantly negative, and the
response ofthe U.S. short rate to the three other national
rates is not significantly different from zero.
The impact ofa shock to the U.S. rate on the U.S. rate
after 16 quarters is generally not significantly different
18. This confidence interval was established by replicating the impulse-
response 1,000 times according to the observed distribution oferrors.
Lags on past changes in rates were reduced to two in the case of short
rates and three for long rates due to a lack of statistical significance of
longer lags. This helped to tighten up the confidence bands around the
impulse-response functions.THROOP/INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION 15
FIGURE 6
IMPULSE-REsPONSE FUNCTIONS: SHORT-TERM RATES
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FIGURE 7
IMPULSE-REsPONSE FUNCTIONS: LoNG-TERM RATES
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from 1 percentage point, as is the response ofthe foreign
rates to a 1 percentage point shock to them. As a result,
there is no significanttendency for real shortrates to come
backtogether once they have been pulledapart by ashock.
This appears tobedueto the absence ofstatic expectations
and a time-varying currency riskpremiain a sample that is
too short to allow one to observe the long-run interest-
equalizing effects ofcapital mobility.19
Figure 7 sho\vs the responses of reallong=tenn interest
rates to shocks to real long-term rates in other countries.
As before, the effect ofa 1percentage point shock after 16
quarters on the rate that is shocked is never significantly
different from 1 percentage point. But the effect of that
shockon the otherreal long-term interest rate is never sig-
nificantly different from zero. So once a shock drives
national real long-term interest rates apart, there is no
measurable tendency for them to be brought together
again. Again this is not evidence against capital being
highly mobile internationally among the major countries.
However, it does indicate that such mobility tends to make
real interest rates converge only over very long periods
oftime.
m. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The impulse-response functions that have been examined
in this study show that there have been virtually no causal
linkages between U.S. andforeign short-termorlong-term
real interest rates for periods of up to 16 quarters. More-
over, ininstances where longer-run linkages couldbe iden-
tified, the association between U.S. and foreign real rates
was positive onlyhalfofthe time. Yet, sincetheearly 1980s
differentials between U.S. and foreign interest rates when
covered for exchange rate risk in eitherthe forward market
or by currency swaps have been close to zero. This elimi-
nates government orinstitutional barriers to capital mobil-
ity as sources of disparities between real interest rates on
19. Using multivariate time-series modeling ofreal interest rate differ-
entials, as opposed to the real rates themselves, Modjtahedi (1988)
reaches quite different conclusions with respect to one-month Euro-
currency rates overfairly short sample periods (1973 through 1979 and
1979 through 1986). First, he finds that national real interest rates are
generally cointegrated, although not always equal in the long run.
Second, he estimates that it takes approximately six months for the
differentials to converge to their long-run values. This estimated speed
ofadjustmentis difficultto square withthe approximatelytwoyears that
it takes for the trade balance to adjust to changes in the exchange rate,
and hence also to changes in interest rates. Rapid adjustment also is
inconsistentwith extended swings inthe real valueofthedollarthathave
been observed to be associated with similarmovements inreal interest
rate differentials.
similar assets and leaves only exchange rate expectations
and premia for exchange rate risk as the contributing
factors.
It is difficult to gauge the relative importance of these
two factors with precision. But there is independent evi-
dencethatbothfactors have beenimportantto someextent.
The evidencefor the importance ofexpectationsis thatreal
interest rate differentials have been shown to be an impor-
tantforce driving real exchange rates away from theirlong-
run equilibrium values for extended periods oftime. This
has been especially true for the U.S. dollar in the first half
ofthe 1980s whenthecombinationofeasyfiscal policyand
tight monetary policy in the U.S. raised U.S. real interest
rates relative to foreign rates. As a result, the real value of
the dollardeviated significantlyfrom its expectedlong-run
equilibrium value, and the condition ofstatic expectations
required for a short-run equalization ofreal interest rates
was far from satisfied.
The imp0ftance ofpremia for exchange rate risk in con-
tributing to divergences in real interest rates is suggested
by evidence from surveys ofmarket expectations offuture
exchange rates. If exchange risk premia were small, we
would expect that differences in anticipated returns on
comparable assets calculated using survey data as a meas-
ure of expected exchange rate changes would be fairly
small. Butinfact this is notthe case.20Therefore, changing
currency risk premia probably also contribute to variation
in differentials between real national interest rates. Unfor-
tunately, however, empirical studies to date have had little
success in isolating the fundamental economic factors that
tend to cause changes in these currency risk premia.21
20. See, for example, Pigott (1993-1994).
21. Studies on the existence of exchange risk premia include Frankel
(1982), Hansenand Hodrick(1983), Hsieh (1982), Hodrickand Srivasta
(1984), and Fama·(1984). Attempts to explain exchange risk premia in
terms of the capital asset pricing model include Engle and Rodrigues
(1989) and Lewis (1988).18 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1994, NUMBER 3
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